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AGlobal Vaccine Injury Compensation System





as those that result in death, threaten life, require inpa-
tienthospitalization,or result in significantdisability, are
rare (eg, <1 adverseeventoccursper 10milliondoses for
tetanus toxoid vaccines, 1-2 adverse events per 1 mil-
liondoses for inactivated influenzavaccine,andnonefor
hepatitis A).2
Yet the specter of vaccine injury plays a central role
in vaccine access and will continue to do so as vaccine
technologies evolve. The public health emergencies
involving influenza A(H1N1), Ebola, and Zika illustrate
the relationship between vaccine access and vaccine
injury. An H1N1-specific vaccine was developedwithin 4
months of the virus being isolated by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, but the demands of
vaccine manufacturers and donating governments for
comprehensive release of liability delayed distribution
of vaccines to low-resource countries by at least 5
months.3 Governments and international organizations
prioritized vaccine injury liability when considering
whether promising Ebola vaccine candidates, which
incorporated technologies unused in any licensed vac-
cine worldwide, might be used to address the out-
break. Because the teratogenic effects of Zika virus
may occur at all stages of pregnancy, candidate Zika
vaccines would be most beneficial if administered prior
to or during pregnancy—the condition most likely to
affect both research and immunization because of
liability concerns.4
There are 3 types of approaches to addressing vac-
cine injury: patients with adverse events may bear the
costs associatedwith their injuries; theymay seek com-
pensation through litigation against private-sector ac-
tors (principallymanufacturers); or theymay seek com-
pensation from publicly supported systems that draw
from public-sector and private-sector contributions.
Each type of approach is supported by an ethical ratio-
nale. The first approach, requiring individuals with vac-
cine injury to bear their own costs, is an extreme utili-
tarian version of the fundamental social contract
supporting immunization.Thebenefitsofvaccinationso
outweigh the risks that communities accept that some
individuals will experience adverse events in return for
herd immunity.
The second approach, requiring manufacturers to
pay, is based on the integrity and dignity of the indi-
vidual person—those whose products cause injury
should make whole those individuals who experienced
an adverse event. These types of approaches are repre-
sentative of the common approach worldwide, yet
they destabilize the effort to promote immunization by
failing fundamental tests for fairness by asking people
with few resources to pay for serious (if rare) injuries
with the first approach vs introducing economic uncer-
tainty with the second.
The third approach, a no-fault compensation sys-
tem for adverse events attributed to vaccination, bal-
ances these competing principles. Under a no-fault
vaccine injurycompensationsystem,governmentscom-
pensate individualswhoareharmedbyproperlymanu-
factured vaccines insteadof requiring them touse legal
or other processes against manufacturers. A no-fault
system acknowledges that a community that pro-
motes immunization, knowing individuals will be in-
jured,must share theburdenof the cost of injuries. This
approachalsoacknowledges thatmanu-
facturers are a critical part of vaccine ac-
cessandthat theymusthaveabasic level
of economic certainty. It fulfills the utili-
tarian and communitarian expectations
ofademocraticsociety.Yetno-faultcom-
pensationsystemsforvaccine injurypre-
vail in only 19 jurisdictionsworldwide in-
cluding the United States.5
A global vaccine injury compensation system to
bring economic certainty would represent a substan-
tial advance to this critical componentof theglobalpub-
lichealth systemandbuild trustnecessary forvaccines—
especially in emergency contexts. Sucha systemwould
address barriers to vaccine manufacturers’ participa-
tion as well as perceptions that contribute to vaccine
hesitancy in low-resource countries. A prominent per-
ceptionsharedbypersons in low-resourcesettings is that
diseaseswith pandemic potential that affect the global
poor are neglected by the world’s major medical re-
search institutions.When one of those diseases threat-
ensEuropeorNorthAmerica, those institutionsandtheir
sponsoring governments invest in relevant medical re-
search but do so using the global poor as relatively un-
protected human research subjects.6 A global vaccine
injury compensation systemmay reduce the hesitancy
among those making the decision to receive a candi-
date vaccine with a limited safety profile.
The ethical and policy rationales behind no-fault
compensation systems for adverse events attributable
to vaccination are clear. Principles of fairness justify
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for a system that compensates those
who experience vaccine injury, especially
when the system is supported by all
responsible parties.
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inequities that inhere in litigation, and fewwho are injured have the
resources to formally complain to administrative or judicial authori-
ties. Moreover, the overwhelming consensus in the public health
literature suggests that no-fault compensation systems increase
public confidence in vaccination.7
Someexamplesunder international lawmay informsucha sys-
tem. Itbeginswithanagreement recognizing theoverwhelming,evi-
dence-based consensus that community-wide immunization pro-
vides an immensepublic health benefit and that thebenefit should
not accrue to the uninjured at the expense of the injured.8 There is
precedent for such a fairness-oriented public health agreement.
The 2011 World Health Organization (WHO) Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework9 allowsvaccinemanufacturers to access
biological materials from the Global Influenza Surveillance and Re-
sponseSystem in return fordonatedordiscountedcontributionsof
resulting vaccines. Manufacturers also contribute toward the cost
of running the facility.
Once the agreement is formed, member states could borrow
the principle of complementarity from other international legal
regimes. Under complementary systems, states agree to either
manage the subject matter of the agreement internally or partici-
pate in a regional or international system of administration. In the
vaccine context, states would agree to establish their own national
systems for no-fault compensation or agree to participate in a
regional or a WHO-administered scheme accomplishing the same
objective. Models exist for national implementation even in low-
resource settings. For example, the WHO already provides assis-
tance to many national technical immunization advisory groups
andmay have a primary role in developing adverse event and com-
pensation tables analogously to the US Department of Health and
Human Services’ Health Resources and Services Administration. In
New Zealand, vaccine injury is under the same administrative
authority as other injuries caused by accident (ie, unintentional
events); the programmay be a model for low-resource countries in
which worker compensation claims systems are more developed.
Several policy options for funding and eligibility and adminis-
tration for WHO, regional, and national systems are shown in the
eTable in the Supplement. The Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO)RevolvingFund, for example,might addanexcise tax to the
price it currently pays for vaccine doses to fund a regional compen-
sation plan. Gavi (Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization),
the vaccine financing organization for the poorest countries, could
require that financeministriesplan (including considerationofpub-
lic or private insurance alternatives) a compensation scheme that
would create a path to ensure those schemes persist after coun-
tries have graduated from receiving Gavi support. The relation-
ships Gavi facilitates between governments and vaccine manufac-
turersmay provide an independent basis for those parties to reach
agreements on no-fault systems.
There isastrongpublichealth justificationforasystemthatcom-
pensates thosewhoexperience vaccine injury, especiallywhen the
system is supported by all responsible parties (governments that
compel immunization and manufacturers that produce the vac-
cines). Establishing a global compensation system could build con-
fidence in the processes that lead to the development of vaccines
deployed in low-resource settings, relievevaccinemanufacturersof
liability concerns that impedevaccine investments, and facilitateef-
fective responses toglobal public health threats likeEbola andZika.
ARTICLE INFORMATION
Published Online: January 23, 2017.
doi:10.1001/jama.2016.19492
Conflict of Interest Disclosures: Both authors
have completed and submitted the ICMJE Form for
Disclosure of Potential Conflicts of Interest and
none were reported.
REFERENCES
1. Berkley S. Global vaccine access as the critical
intervention to fight infectious disease, antibiotic
resistance, and poverty. In: Halabi S, Gostin L,
Crowley J, eds. Global Management of Infectious
Disease After Ebola. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press; 2016:chap 10.
2. World Health Organization. WHO vaccine
reaction rates information sheets. http://www.who
.int/vaccine_safety/initiative/tools/vaccinfosheets
/en/. Accessed November 20, 2016.
3. Halabi SF. Obstacles to pH1N1 vaccine
availability: the complex contracting relationship
between vaccine manufacturers, WHO, donor and
beneficiary governments. In: Stoto MA, HigdonM,
eds. The Public Health Response to H1N1: A Systems
Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press;
2015:chap 13.
4. Omer SB, Beigi RH. Pregnancy in the time of
Zika: addressing barriers for developing vaccines
and other measures for pregnant women. JAMA.
2016;315(12):1227-1228.
5. Looker C, Kelly H. No-fault compensation
following adverse events attributed to vaccination:
a review of international programmes. Bull World
Health Organ. 2011;89(5):371-378.
6. Halabi SF, Monahan J. Sharing the burden of
Ebola vaccine–related adverse events. Tulane J Int
Comp Law. 2015;24(1):131-142.
7. Wilson K. Protecting vaccine programs and the
public. CMAJ. 2007;176(12):1681, 1683.
8. Mello MM. Rationalizing vaccine injury
compensation. Bioethics. 2008;22(1):32-42.
9. World Health Organization. Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness Framework for the Sharing of
Influenza Viruses and Access to Vaccines and Other
Benefits. http://www.who.int/influenza/resources
/pip_framework/en/. Accessed January 10, 2017.
Opinion Viewpoint
472 JAMA February 7, 2017 Volume 317, Number 5 (Reprinted) jama.com
Downloaded From:  by a University of Missouri - Columbia User  on 10/16/2017
